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Low Timing Jitter Detector for Gigahertz 
Quantum Key Distribution 
 
 




A superconducting single-photon detector based on a niobium nitride nanowire is 
demonstrated in an optical-fibre-based quantum key distribution test bed operating at a 
clock rate of 3.3 GHz and a transmission wavelength of 850 nm. The low jitter of the 
detector leads to significant reduction in the estimated quantum bit error rate and a 
resultant improvement in the secrecy efficiency compared to previous estimates made 
by use of silicon single-photon avalanche detectors. 
 
Introduction: Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) [1], [2], [3] offers a verifiably secure 
method to share cryptographic keys between two remote parties (Alice and Bob).   QKD 
allows Alice and Bob to detect the presence of an eavesdropper (Eve) and to agree 
upon a secure encryption key for communication by encoding information on the states 
of individual photons.   
 
We have previously constructed a QKD test bed based on the B92 protocol [2] using 
highly attenuated pulses from vertical cavity surface emitting lasers (VCSELs) operating 
at a wavelength of 850 nm in conjunction with a quantum transmission channel 
composed of standard telecommunications optical fibre (single-mode at wavelengths of 
1300/1550 nm) [4][5][6].  In standard telecommunications optical fibre, the 850 nm 
wavelength light propagates as two modes (LP01 and LP11), and due to mode dispersion 
these two modes travel at different velocities, causing a spreading of the optical pulses 
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that can lead to an increase in the quantum bit error rate (QBER).  In our test bed, the 
second-order mode is suppressed by utilising mode control methods, allowing us to 
achieve clock rates of up to 3 GHz using silicon single photon avalanche diodes (Si 
SPADs) [6],[7].  In this letter we present estimates of QBER for a QKD test bed 
operating at a frequency of 3.3 GHz and using a low-jitter superconducting single-photon 
detectors (SSPDs) based on niobium nitride nanowires [8],[9]. 
 
The SSPDs used in this work were 100 nm wide niobium nitride meander wires, 
covering a 10 µm x 10 µm area with a fill factor of 50 %.  Each superconducting wire 
was biased close to its critical current; when a photon strikes the wire a resistive hotspot 
is formed, triggering a measurable voltage pulse.  The SSPD detectors were fibre-
coupled with single-mode telecom fibre, packaged and installed in a cryogen-free 
refrigerator system, with an operating temperature of 3 K [10].  These detectors offer low 
jitter (68 ps full width at half maximum - FWHM) [11] and fast recovery times (below 
10_ns), making them highly promising candidates for QKD at gigahertz clock rates. 
 
Experimental Test bed: Figure 1 shows a schematic of the QKD test bed.  The layout is 
described in detail in [4], [5] and [6].  The mean photon number per pulse leaving Alice 
(µ) is 0.1±6×10-3.  Different quantum channel transmission distances are simulated with 
a programmable digital attenuator.  At 850 nm an attenuation of 2.2 dB corresponds to a 
distance of 1 km in fibre.  In this demonstration we used a pair of SSPDs in place of Si 
SPADs.  Amplified voltage pulses from each SSPD were recorded separately by a time-
correlated single-photon counting (TCSPC) card [12] in a desktop PC that was operated 
in histogram mode.   
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The QBER in a QKD system is defined as the ratio of error bits to the total number of 
bits received.  In QKD, all errors are attributed to the presence of an eavesdropper 
(Eve).  With rising QBER an increasing proportion of received bits must be expended in 
privacy amplification to minimize Eve’s share of the information.  In our B92 QKD 
scheme the distillation efficiency of secret key (the ratio of the final secure bit rate to the 
raw detector events) is given by [13]: 
 
( ) ( )( )[ ]QQQIQQQ AE 5.31log)1(15.3log1EfficiencySecrecy 22 −−−−−−+≈  (1) 
 
where Q is the QBER and IAE =0.29 is the maximum information shared between Alice 
and Eve for the B92 protocol [14].  Although the B92 protocol is inherently more 
susceptible to the “intercept and resend” attack with a lossless channel, it was chosen 
for experimental simplicity. This test bed was used to characterise optical components 
such as detectors in order to assess their suitability in future implementations of more 
secure QKD protocols.   
 
In the context of high bit rate polarisation-encoding QKD there are usually three 
contributions to the QBER: 
 
IntDetOpt QBERQBERQBERQBER ++= .         (2) 
  
The first term, QBEROpt, is due to the polarisation extinction ratio resulting mainly from 
passive optical components within the optical system.  This is a measure of the optical 
quality of the setup and is independent of transmission distance.  The second term, 
QBERDet , arises from the detector dark counts.  At high link loss, the number of received 
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bits falls and the contribution of dark counts to the QBER increases.  The third term is 
the intersymbol interference, where errors are caused by counts from a given clock 
period that leak into the adjacent period due to source jitter, detector jitter, and 
dispersion in the transmission medium.  This term usually sets the minimum QBER in 
high clock rate QKD using SPADs with ~400 ps FWHM jitter [5].  In this demonstration 
we are able to reduce this source of error by employing a detector with significantly 
lower jitter (SSPD, 68 ps FWHM). 
 
Results: Figure 2 shows the QBER and net bit rate (NBR – the projected distillation rate 
of secret key, given by multiplying equation (1) by the raw event rate at the detectors) for 
the test bed at a clock rate of 3.3 GHz by use of the SSPD receiver.  With this low-jitter 
detector we were able to achieve a QBER below 1 % out to 20 km simulated 
transmission distance.  As a consequence of the increased loss in the quantum channel 
of 2.2 dBkm-1, the rate of the raw events at the detector decreases with distance, leading 
to a corresponding decrease in the NBR.  The dominant error contribution in the 1-20km 
range is the polarisation contrast, and not the dark count rate.  At 25 ± 0.11 km the 
estimated QBER is 3.6 ± 0.2 %, due to the rising influence of dark counts (below 10 Hz 
per SSPD channel).  Although the dark count probability within the coincidence window 
is low, the greatly reduced rate of incident photons at the detector means that the QBER 
shows a significant increase.  This overall behaviour of the QBER contrasts with 
previous results in this test bed for Si SPADs with 400 ps jitter clocked at 2 GHz, where 
intersymbol interference prevented the QBER from falling below 5 %, and QBER rises 
above 11 % - the limit for secure transmission according to Equation (1) - at 12 km [5].  
The detection efficiency of the SSPD at a wavelength of 850_nm is ~5 %, compared to 
40 % for the Si SPAD, which leads to a corresponding reduction in the photon detection 
rate at Bob.  However, the significantly lower timing jitter of the SSPD results in very low 
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QBERs, allowing an improved secrecy efficiency compared to that achieved by use of a 
Si SPAD.   As a result, the maximum NBR (at short transmission distances) was similar 
for SSPDs used in a 3.3 GHz clocked system and for Si SPADs in a 2 GHz clocked 
system [15], but the SSPDs offer a clear improvement in overall transmission range.   
 
Conclusions:  We have demonstrated the impact of an SSPD detector in a high bit rate 
QKD test-bed at a clock frequency of 3.3 GHz and a transmission wavelength of 
850_nm.  The maximum NBR achieved is comparable to that of the more widely used Si 
SPADs at 2 GHz [15], with greatly improved secrecy efficiency.  The low jitter of the 
SSPD allows low QBER to be achieved for significantly longer simulated transmission 
distances (up to 25 km).  We emphasise that there is considerable scope for further 
improvements in performance using this detector in the realm of high bit rate QKD.  The 
SSPD can be used at 1310 nm or 1550 nm wavelengths, where fibre transmission 
losses are significantly lower, allowing the system transmission range to be extended 
significantly [16].   The low jitter of the detector (68 ps FWHM) means that system clock 
rates can in principle be increased to ~10 GHz.  Furthermore, new designs incorporating 
SSPDs into optical cavities allow significant improvements in detection efficiency (up to 
57 %) [17]. Both the increased clock rates and detection efficiencies afforded by the 
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Figure captions: 
Fig. 1  The quantum key distribution test bed used to measure the performance 
of the superconducting single photon detector (SSPD).  The initial data-stream to 
drive the high-speed vertical cavity surface emitting lasers (VCSELs) was a non-
return to zero (NRZ) signal from a pulse pattern generator (PPG).  The 
telecommunications fibre quantum channel was simulated by using additional 
attenuation in Alice. 
 
Fig. 2  Quantum Bit Error Rate (QBER) and Net Bit Rate (NBR, secret key 
transmission rate) for the quantum key distribution test bed using the 
superconducting single photon detector (SSPD). 
 
  QBER measured by superconducting single photon detector 
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Figure 2 
 
